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Street Vendors Regulation in Magelang Regency: Implementation of Regional Regulation No. 7 of 2009 on Organising and Empowering Street Vendors outside Markets and Terminals

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Abstract

Street vendors (PKL) sustain livelihoods in the informal economy, yet their stalls obstruct roads and pavements, and in Magelang Regency many trade outside the sites set aside for them. This article asks how Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 on the Organising and Empowerment of Street Vendors has been implemented to create public order outside markets and terminals, which obstacles hinder it and what has been done about them. It is empirical legal research with a socio-legal approach, using observation, interviews and documents of the Department of Trade, Cooperatives and SMEs and the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP), analysed through Merilee Grindle's model of the content of policy and the context of implementation. In 2022 the Regency counted 4,558 vendors, 986 in Muntilan. Relocation sites were built from 2015 to 2019, but only 30 of the 70 stalls at two Mertoyudan sites were occupied, about 250 vendors remained on the streets of Muntilan, and Satpol PP had 76 officers against the 251 to 350 suggested by the ministerial guideline. The policy is adequate in design but weak in resources and compliance, so implementation has not yet achieved its public order aim. Obstacles are poorly sited relocation sites, too few enforcement staff and limited understanding among vendors. The article recommends siting criteria, a staffing target, a simpler permit and monitoring.

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Keywords

Vendors; Relocation; Implementation; Enforcement; Regulation; Magelang

Introduction

Many people earn a living as street vendors (pedagang kaki lima, PKL), who sell goods and services directly to buyers, often because jobs are scarce for people with few skills and the government cannot supply them. Vendors are found not only in big cities but in regencies and sub-districts. In Magelang Regency they sell snacks, food and second-hand goods from carts, tents, stalls, motor vehicles and bicycles on roadsides, shop fronts and busy places, and so can block traffic and take pedestrians' space. Vendors serve people on low incomes but also raise social and environmental problems, and the arrangement of public space therefore has to balance livelihood and order.[1][2][3]

To organise and empower vendors, the Department of Trade, Cooperatives and SMEs (Disdagkop dan UKM) has built relocation sites: Mertoyudan Corner (28 stalls, also called Magelang Corner in the Department's documents) for vendors along Jalan Bambang Sugeng, Mertoyudan–Mungkid; the Banjarnegara Rest Area (42 stalls) for vendors along the Pakelan–Tanjung road; Bambu Runcing in Muntilan (21 stalls); and permitted evening sites in Muntilan, for which vendors dismantle their stalls every day. Even so, vendors still sell outside the relocation sites and violate the bans, and Muntilan, the most strategic and accessible area, has the most violations.

The legal setting explains why the question matters. Vendors have no right to trade on public roads. Their activity is recognised as part of the micro-enterprise sector, which government is to foster,[4] and the national framework calls on regions to organise and empower them,[5][6] while public order is a mandatory function of regional government.[7] Regional governments may enforce their regulations through Satpol PP, which may be given powers of investigation,[8] and pedestrians are entitled to facilities such as pavements.[9] Magelang Regency Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 is the local instrument; Regent's Regulation No 43 of 2012 supplies its implementing guidelines.[10][11] The study excludes markets and terminals because

[1] Dinarjati Eka Puspitasari, "Penataan Pedagang Kaki Lima Kuliner untuk Mewujudkan Fungsi Tata Ruang Kota di Kota Yogyakarta dan Kabupaten Sleman" (2010) 22:3 *Mimbar Hukum* 588, DOI: <10.22146/jmh.16244>.

[2] Rino Subangkit, "Implementasi Peraturan Daerah Kota Surabaya No 2 Tahun 2014 tentang Penyelenggaraan Ketertiban Umum dan Ketentraman Masyarakat" (2016) 4:1 *Publika*.

[3] Revian Fajar Arliyanto, *Implementasi Peraturan Daerah Nomor 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pengaturan Pedagang Kaki Lima di Kota Tegal* (Thesis, Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2020).

[4] Law No 20 of 2008 on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Indonesia).

[5] Presidential Regulation No 125 of 2012 on the Coordination of the Organising and Empowerment of Street Vendors (Indonesia).

[6] Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 41 of 2012 on Guidelines for Organising and Empowering Street Vendors (Indonesia).

[7] Law No 23 of 2014 on Regional Government (Indonesia), art 12(1).

[8] *Ibid*, arts 255–256.

[9] Law No 22 of 2009 on Road Traffic and Transportation (Indonesia), art 131(1).

[10] Magelang Regency Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 on the Organising and Empowerment of Street Vendors (Indonesia).

[11] Magelang Regent's Regulation No 43 of 2012 on Implementing Guidelines for Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 on the Organising and Empowerment of Street Vendors (Indonesia).

those places are managed under their own regimes of retribution and management, and vendors outside them are the group that the Regulation was made to organise.

Earlier studies of street-vendor regulation have concentrated on other places. Puspitasari studied the arrangement of culinary vendors in Yogyakarta and Sleman in relation to the spatial plan;[12] Arliyanto examined the implementation of the Tegal city regulation on vendors;[13] and Subangkit and Wibisono and Tukiman studied the relocation of vendors to the Bulak Fish Center in Surabaya.[14][15] None applies a policy-implementation model with explicit criteria to a regency regulation, or tests the outcome against occupancy data for relocation sites. This study does so for Magelang Regency, a regency in which vendors are spread over many sub-districts and a single sub-district, Muntilan, concentrates the violations.

The study therefore asks: (1) how is the policy in Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 implemented to create public order outside markets and terminals in Magelang Regency, judged by the content of the policy and the context of implementation in Grindle's model; and (2) which obstacles are met, what has the Regency actually done about them, and what should it do? Its purpose is to assess the implementation against stated criteria and to propose measurable improvements.

Research Method

This is empirical legal research with a socio-legal approach. It studies how Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 works in practice, treating law as a policy whose implementation can be observed. Only the sociological approach and the policy-implementation model are used in the analysis; legal-psychological and legal-anthropological approaches are not applied. The object is the Regulation and its implementing guidelines.[16][17] The data are primary and secondary. Primary data come from observation of vendors and relocation sites and from interviews with officials of the Department and of Satpol PP. The records available to the authors do not state the number, positions or dates of the interviews, so findings are attributed to the Department's and Satpol PP's own data and statements rather than

[12] Puspitasari, *supra* note 1.
[13] Arliyanto, *supra* note 3.
[14] Subangkit, *supra* note 2.
[15] Rizky Wibisono & Tukiman, "Implementasi Kebijakan Penataan Pedagang Kaki Lima di Sentra Ikan Bulak Kenjeran Kecamatan Bulak Kota Surabaya" (2017) 1:2 *JPSI (Journal of Public Sector Innovations)* 55, DOI: <10.26740/jpsi.v1n2.p55-58>.
[16] Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009, *supra* note 10.
[17] Regent's Regulation No 43 of 2012, *supra* note 11.

to individual informants. Secondary data are the Department's 2022 vendor data,[18] the Regulation, the Regent's Regulation and the national rules cited above.

The analysis uses Grindle's model, which divides implementation into the content of policy and the context in which it is implemented.[19] The model was preferred to Edwards III's four-factor model,[20] because the Regulation is carried out by many agencies against a target group with its own interests, and Grindle's indicators of interests affected, power and compliance capture that conflict, while Edwards's model centres on the implementing organisation. Each indicator is operationalised in Table 3 as a finding, its evidence and a rating of met, partly met or not met. Because the model describes conditions rather than success, three outcome criteria are added: the share of vendors in permitted locations, the occupancy of relocation sites, and the trend in violations. Where the data do not allow a criterion to be measured, the text says so.

Results and Discussion

The Regulation and Its Implementing Rules

The Regional Regulation has 16 articles in 11 chapters: general provisions, scope and objectives, determination of locations and times, vendor permits, vendors' obligations, rights and prohibitions, empowerment and guidance, supervision and enforcement, administrative sanctions, investigation, criminal provisions and closing provisions.[21] It was made because street vendors benefit the informal sector but multiplied, causing disorder, dirt and traffic obstruction by selling on public facilities such as road shoulders and pavements. Regent's Regulation No 43 of 2012 contains its guidelines: under Article 22(1) the Regent, through the trade department, supervises vendors, and under Article 23(1) enforcement is carried out by Satpol PP.[22] The Satpol PP procedure followed Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No 54 of 2011,[23] which has since been superseded in practice by Regulation No 16 of 2023, issued under Government Regulation No 16 of 2018;[24][25] the guideline on the number of officers, Regulation No 60 of 2012, has not been

[18] Dinas Perdagangan, Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil Menengah Kabupaten Magelang, street vendor data for 2022 (unpublished data supplied to the authors).
[19] Merilee S Grindle (ed), *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
[20] George C Edwards III, *Implementing Public Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980).
[21] Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009, *supra* note 10.
[22] Regent's Regulation No 43 of 2012, *supra* note 11, arts 22(1), 23(1).
[23] Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 54 of 2011 on Standard Operating Procedures of Civil Service Police Units (Indonesia).
[24] Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 16 of 2023 on Standard Operating Procedures of Civil Service Police Units and the Code of Ethics of Civil Service Police Officers (Indonesia).
[25] Government Regulation No 16 of 2018 on Civil Service Police Units (Indonesia).

replaced as far as could be established.[26] The Regulation provides administrative sanctions, an investigation chapter and criminal provisions, but the texts available for this study do not allow their content to be set out, and this is a limit of the analysis. Regional regulations may in general prescribe imprisonment of up to six months or a fine of up to Rp50 million.[27]

Organising and Empowerment: Data

The Department counted 4,558 street vendors across 21 sub-districts in 2022 (Table 1), most of them in Muntilan (986), followed by Srumbung (381), Borobudur (335), Sawangan (292), Ngablak (271) and Mungkid (255).[28] By type of place of business there were 2,067 vendors using mats, tents or shelters, 676 using carts, 843 bicycles, 799 motorcycles and 173 cars, which sum to the total of 4,558. By type of business 2,876 sold food, 741 drinks, 435 fruit, 321 goods and 170 services, which sum to 4,543, fifteen fewer than the total. The difference is unexplained in the data supplied and probably reflects vendors who were not classified. The figures are the Department's count for 2022 and are not a time series.

Table 1. Street vendors by type of place of business, Magelang Regency, 2022

Type of place of business	**Number**
Mat, tent or shelter	2,067
Cart	676
Bicycle	843
Motorcycle	799
Car	173
Total	4,558

Source: Disdagkop dan UKM, Magelang Regency, 2022 data as supplied to the authors.

The Department's organising programmes began in 2015 with vendors in Muntilan (Jalan Pemuda, Sayangan, Klagon, Plaza Muntilan, Tugu Besi and Kartini–Tape Ketan). In 2017 Mertoyudan Corner (28 stalls) was opened and judged successful because most vendors occupied it; in 2018 the Banjarnegara Rest Area in Mertoyudan (42 stalls) was judged successful for the same reason; and in 2019 the Bambu Runcing site in Muntilan (21 stalls) was opened, where vendors agreed to move. The 2022 situation is set out in Table 2. About 250 vendors remain in the streets of Muntilan, Bambu Runcing is full, Mertoyudan Corner has 16 of 28 stalls occupied because it lies back from the road and has no visible sign, and the Rest Area has 14 of 42 occupied, a decline the Department attributes to Covid-19 and to

[26] Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 60 of 2012 on Guidelines for Determining the Number of Civil Service Police Officers (Indonesia).
[27] Law No 23 of 2014, *supra* note 7, art 238(2).
[28] Disdagkop dan UKM Magelang, 2022 data, *supra* note 18.

few buyers. The earlier judgments of success therefore measured uptake at opening, not whether it lasted: by 2022 only 30 of the 70 Mertoyudan stalls (43 per cent) were in use, and 51 of the 91 stalls at the three sites (56 per cent). Empowerment consists of socialisation five times a year with vendors' representatives from the sub-districts. The occupancy figures refer to 2022; the Department gave no earlier dates.

Table 2. Condition of relocation sites, 2022

Site	Stalls	Occupied	Reason given
Bambu Runcing (Muntilan)	21	21	Facilities adequate
Mertoyudan Corner	28	16	Set back from road, sign not visible
Banjarnegara Rest Area (Mertoyudan)	42	14	Few buyers since Covid-19
Muntilan streets (not relocated)	–	about 250 vendors remain	Strategic location

Source: Disdagkop dan UKM, Magelang Regency, 2022 data as supplied to the authors.

Enforcement

Satpol PP enforces the Regulation in stages: first outreach and guidance on site; then, after repeated violation, written warning 1 (seven days), warning 2 (seven days) and warning 3 (three days); then dismantling of the stall by Satpol PP or by the owner by agreement; and, if the vendor persists, removal of equipment to the Satpol PP office as part of guidance. In 2018 it carried out a non-judicial repressive operation in Mertoyudan, in front of the Bulurejo village office, where vendors sold above an irrigation channel and built permanent structures; no illegal buildings were found from 2019 to 2022. The Satpol PP records available do not give the number of warnings issued or stalls dismantled each year, so the trend in violations cannot be measured; this is a gap that the recommendations address. The removal of equipment needs a clear legal basis because it affects property. The material available identifies no provision of the Regulation or the Regent's Regulation that authorises it, and the authors should identify one, together with a way for the vendor to object and to recover the goods. Without them the step rests only on the stated aim of guidance, which is a weak footing for the seizure of property.[29]

Grindle's Content of Policy and Context of Implementation

Under the content of policy, six indicators are examined. The interests affected include the public's right as road users under Article 131(1) of Law No 22 of 2009,[30] vendors' interest in location and time under Article 4, and in empowerment under

[29] Law No 23 of 2014, *supra* note 7, art 255.
[30] Law No 22 of 2009, *supra* note 9, art 131(1).

Article 11, of the Regulation, and the duties of the trade department and Satpol PP under the Regent's Regulation.[31] The benefits are orderly roads for the public, trading sites for vendors and capacity building. The change sought is that vendors trade at designated sites without disorder. The programme is correctly located: under Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No 90 of 2019 enforcement belongs to the public order programme and organising vendors to the micro-business programme, although the nomenclature has since been updated.[32] Implementers are named in detail, with some twenty agencies involved. Resources are the weak point: the trade department has enough staff, but Satpol PP has 76 officers against the 251 to 350 suggested by Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No 60 of 2012, a shortfall of at least 175.[33] On the context of implementation, Satpol PP has the power to enforce and the department to supervise through organising; the institution accepts public complaints by visit, telephone, SMS or letter; and the target group's compliance and responsiveness are low, since vendors sell daily on pavements and road shoulders and avoid obtaining permits.

Table 3 sets out each indicator with its evidence and rating. Content is largely adequate: five of the six indicators are met or partly met, and resources are not. In the context group only the institutional arrangements for complaints are met, while compliance is not. The outcome criteria point the same way: 56 per cent of the stalls at the three sites are occupied, about 250 vendors remain on the streets of Muntilan (roughly a quarter of the 986 counted there, if the same base applies), the number of permits issued is not reported and the trend in violations cannot be measured. The finding that implementation has not succeeded therefore follows from outcomes and from resources and compliance, not from the content of the policy, which is reasonable on paper. The difference matters for policy: the Regulation does not need rewriting so much as better sites, more enforcers and a simpler path to a permit.

Table 3. Grindle's indicators applied to the implementation of Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009

Indicator	Evidence	Rating
Interests affected	Road users (Law No 22 of 2009, art 131(1)); vendors (Regulation, arts 4 and 11); trade department and Satpol PP	Met
Benefits	Orderly roads; trading sites; capacity building through socialisation five times a year	Partly met
Change sought	Vendors to trade at designated sites; 30 of 70 Mertoyudan stalls and about 250 Muntilan vendors outside the sites	Partly met
Programme location	Enforcement under public order, organising under micro-business (Regulation No 90 of 2019)	Met

[31] Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009, *supra* note 10, arts 4, 11.

[32] Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 90 of 2019 on the Classification, Codification and Nomenclature of Regional Development Planning and Finance (Indonesia).

[33] Ministerial Regulation No 60 of 2012, *supra* note 26.

Implementers named	About twenty agencies; Regent's Regulation arts 22(1) and 23(1)	Met
Resources	Satpol PP 76 officers against 251 to 350; trade department adequate	Not met
Power, interests, strategies	Satpol PP enforces, department supervises; vendors resist leaving strategic places	Partly met
Institutional characteristics	Complaints by visit, telephone, SMS or letter; staged enforcement	Met
Compliance and responsiveness	Daily selling on pavements and road shoulders; permits avoided	Not met

Source: compiled by the authors from the Department's and Satpol PP's data and the legislation cited.

Obstacles and Efforts

Three obstacles are named. First, relocation sites are not strategic, so vendors return to their old places. Table 2 shows the pattern: the site that is full, Bambu Runcing, is in Muntilan where vendors already trade, while Mertoyudan Corner is set back from the road without a visible sign and the Rest Area suffered from few buyers. Second, human resources are too few for the size of the Regency, so supervision is insufficient and enforcement cannot run 24 hours a day. Third, vendors do not understand the Regulation, so many have no permit and sell on public facilities.

The efforts reported are partly actions and partly intentions. The Regency has built four kinds of relocation site between 2015 and 2019, enforces in stages, held the 2018 operation in Mertoyudan and holds socialisation five times a year. The records available show no budget for new sites, no recruitment of Satpol PP staff and no attendance figures for the sessions. The proposals to choose strategic sites, add staff and improve inter-agency socialisation are therefore intentions rather than measures with results, and the claim that the efforts have been examined holds only for the actions listed above.

The data point to causes beyond the three named. Vendors choose strategic places such as Muntilan because their income depends on passing buyers, so a site that fails to deliver buyers loses them, as the Rest Area did. The cost of a stall or the daily dismantling required at evening sites may also deter vendors. Vendors are reluctant to obtain permits, but the records do not say why. It may be the cost or the process, or the fear that a permit ties them to a site they do not want. These explanations are inferences from the data and need testing by interviews with vendors, which the study did not conduct.

Comparison with Earlier Research

The findings agree with earlier studies in showing that relocation is hard to sustain. At the Bulak Fish Center in Surabaya, Wibisono and Tukiman found that vendors did not fully comply with rules on numbers and goods and that the centre was quiet

because many had left;[34] Subangkit found that the relocation went well on communication, resources, structure and disposition, but that two years later the market was not full.[35] The Mertoyudan sites repeat this pattern. Puspitasari, studying Yogyakarta and Sleman, found that vendors disregard public-space rules even while contributing to local revenue, and sought a model that fits the spatial plan;[36] the Magelang data suggest that the model must also fit where buyers are. Arliyanto asked whether the arrangement in Tegal accords with its regulation and which factors help or hinder it,[37] a question this study puts to a regency regulation. Unlike these studies, it applies stated criteria to occupancy and resource figures, and it separates a sound policy design from poor outcomes.

Conclusion

On the first question, implementation of Regional Regulation No 7 of 2009 outside markets and terminals in Magelang Regency has not yet succeeded under Grindle's model. The content of the policy is mostly adequate, but enforcement resources and vendors' compliance are not, and the outcomes are poor: 56 per cent of relocation stalls are occupied and about 250 vendors remain on the streets of Muntilan. On the second question, the obstacles are non-strategic relocation sites, too few staff and vendors' lack of understanding, with vendors' dependence on strategic places and the permit process as likely further causes. The Regency has built sites and held socialisation, but staffing and siting remedies remain intentions.

Four recommendations follow. First, a siting criterion for relocation sites should require visibility from the road, expected footfall and accessibility, tested with the vendors concerned before building. Second, the Regency should set a staffing target for Satpol PP, moving towards the guideline range, with a budget line, and should check whether the guideline remains in force. Third, the permit process should be simplified for micro-vendors and its cost and time made known. Fourth, the Department and Satpol PP should monitor the share of vendors in permitted places, site occupancy, permits issued, and warnings and dismantlings each year, and should state the legal basis and a remedy for any removal of equipment. The study has limits: it covers one regency, the number and dates of interviews are not recorded, the data are for 2022 and are affected by the pandemic, and vendors' own views were not collected.

[34] Wibisono & Tukiman, *supra* note 15.
[35] Subangkit, *supra* note 2.
[36] Puspitasari, *supra* note 1.
[37] Arliyanto, *supra* note 3.

Ethics and Data Availability

The research drew on observation, interviews with officials who took part in their official capacity, and official documents. It collected no sensitive personal data, reports findings at the level of agencies and identifies no individual, so formal ethical approval was not required. The aggregate vendor figures come from the Department's 2022 data cited in the article, and the legal materials are publicly available.

Use of Generative AI

Generative AI was used only to improve the language of this article (grammar, clarity and style). The authors reviewed the output and are responsible for the content of the article.

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